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FAMILY LAW
RICHARD A. ELLISON*
MARIO E. OCCHIALINO**
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

A bilateral Alabama divorce, obtained without either party residing
in Alabama, was given full faith and credit recognition in In re Joseph'
on the speculation that the Alabama courts, because nine years had
elapsed since the divorce was obtained, would probably hold that laches
barred an attack on the decree. This case arose out of the application of
the surviving "spouse" for letters of administration, and the court indicated that even if full faith and credit did not require recognition, the
decree could be recognized as a matter of comity.
In challenges to ex parte sister state divorces, the Appellate Division, First Department, in Milbank v. Milbank,2 upheld a Nevada di3
vorce decree, while the Court of Appeals, in Pneuman v. Pneuman,
without opinion, upheld the finding of the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department,' that a bona fide domicile was never established in Idaho,
and thus an Idaho decree was not entitled to recognition in New York.
In neither of these cases was the effect of Section 250 of the Domestic
Relations Law directly in issue.
The recognition given by the Court of Appeals in Gleason v.
Gleason 5 to the belief that no public purpose is served by perpetuating
dead marriages appears to have significantly influenced the result in a
number of cases during the past year. It was held in one case' that a
default decree of divorce should be granted the plaintiff on the grounds
of cruel and inhuman treatment even though the acts complained of
arose twenty years prior to the commencement of the action. The court
held that the five year limitation period contained in Section 210 of the
Domestic Relations Law was a true statute of limitations that could be
* Richard A. Ellison is Assistant Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law
and a Member of the New York Bar.
** Mario E. Occhialino is Associate Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law
and a Member of the New York Bar.
I. 27 N.Y.2d 299, 265 N.E.2d 756,317 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1970).
2. 36 App. Div. 2d 292, 320 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dep't 1971).
3 27 NY.2d 982, 267 N.E.2d 478, 318 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1970).
4. Pneuman v. Pneuman, 33 App. Div. 2d 646, 305 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1969).
5. 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
6. Figueroa v. Figueroa, 66 Misc. 2d 257, 320 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1971).
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raised only as a defense to the action and was not part of the cause of
action.
In Martin v. Martin,7 it was held that an open court stipulation
entered into between the parties, in a previous habeas corpus proceeding,
wherein the parties agreed to live separate and apart and which was
incorporated into a judgment, satisfied Section 170(6) of the Domestic
Relations Law, which requires that the parties live separate and apart
pursuant to a separation agreement, and thus a decree was granted.
Reasoning that since the purpose of requiring a separation agreement
was to authenticate the fact of separation, the court found no reason to
deny recognition to the stipulation which accomplished the same result.
In another case, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed a special term order and awarded a judgment of divorce pursuant
to Section 170(5) of the Domestic Relations Law even though the evidence established that the husband had been delinquent in making alimony payments. Finding that while the delinquency had occurred for a
number of years, the husband complied with the decree during the eight
years immediately preceding the commencement of the action, and there
was thus substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the
decree.
In the wake of Boddie v. Connecticut,9 a lower court 0 held that due
process of law and equal protection of law mandated that the City of
New York pay the cost of publication of a summons in a divorce proceeding on behalf of an indigent person who could not otherwise gain
access to the court to prosecute her divorce proceeding.
Legislation.-The cut-off date and the thirty day period for filing
the separation agreement, or a memorandum thereof, was eliminated
during the past session of the legislature.'
FAMILY SUPPORT

ChildSupport.-Recognizing that one parent should not be permitted to litigate away the rights of a non-party child, 2 a recent case 13 held
7. 63 Misc. 2d 530, 312 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1970).
8. Rubin v. Rubin, 35 App. Div. 2d 460, 317 N.Y.S.2d 571 (4th Dep't 1971).
9. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10. Dorsey v. City of New York, 66 Misc. 2d 464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
1971).
I1. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1971, ch. 801, amending N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
12. Cf. Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 21, 172 N.E.2d 283, 210
N.Y.S.2d 520 (1961).
13. Adams v. Adams, 66 Misc. 2d 378, 320 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1971).
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that an infant was a third-party beneficiary and had a cause of action
against his father for breach of a separation agreement even though the
monies sued for were to be paid to the mother of the infant for his
benefit, and even though the clause in the separation agreement had been
previously litigated by the mother. Because the infant was not a party
to the earlier proceeding, the cause of action was not barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. The infant in this case was not suing to
enforce periodic child support payments but rather was seeking to enforce a provision that obligated the father to pay educational expenses. 4
If child support payments are to be reduced, pursuant to a separation agreement, when the child is attending college away from home,
such a contingency should be clearly specified. In Backstatter v.
Backstatter, 5 it was held that a child did not "cease to have his permanent residence with the Wife" when he was a full-time student at the
Merchant Marine Academy nor did he become emancipated by the
receipt of a government allowance while in attendance at the Academy.
In a much publicized case, Roe v. Doe, 6 the Court of Appeals held
that a twenty-year-old college student could not refuse to change her lifestyle, deemed by her father to be harmful to her best interest, and still
expect him to be obligated to provide for her support and college expenses.
The father has the right, in the absence of caprice, misconduct or neglect,
to require that the daughter conform to his reasonable demands. Should
she disagree, and at her age that is surely her prerogative, she may elect
not to comply; but in so doing, she subjects herself to her father's lawful
wrath. Where, as here, she abandons her home, she forfeits her right to
support. 7
If the concurring opinion of Judge Jasen is correct in stating that
this decision means the conduct of a parent is now subject to judicial
review to determine if such was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
then it is indeed a far reaching decision. However, it appears that the
decision is more restrictive and confines judicial intervention to those
instances where there is a showing of misconduct, neglect, or abuse on
the part of the parent and thus it does not depart significantly from
14,
15.
16.
17,
18

See Forman v. Forman, 17 N.Y.2d 274, 217 N.E.2d 645, 270 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1966).
66 Misc. 2d 331, 320 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1971).
29 NY.2d 188,272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971).
Id. at 194, 272 N.E.2d at 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76.
Id. at 194, 272 N.E.2d at 571, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
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previous decisions of the Court. 9
Jurisdiction.-A 3-2 First Department decision refused to subject
a non-domiciliary defendant who was personally served with process in
Virginia, to in personam jurisdiction in a divorce action. The court
indicated that the right of the wife to alimony was to be determined by
the courts of Virginia, the domicile of the husband. The fact that the
defendant may have had minimal contacts with the state of New York
still did not subject him to in personam jurisdiction because, as the
Court indicated, matrimonial actions are not one of the specific classes
of actions under CPLR Section 302.21 The dissenting opinion, however,
argued that the defendant's minimal contacts with the state together
with its strong interest in the financial support of its residents, gives the
courts of this state the constitutional power to acquire jurisdiction over
this non-domiciliary.22 However, while the dissent might very well be
correct in finding constitutional power to acquire in personam jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary, this finding goes to what the legislature
might have done and not what was in fact enacted under CPLR Section
302.23
The omission of the divorced wife from coverage under the Uniform
Support of Dependents Law, 24 coupled with this decision, places a harsh
burden on a resident of this state who now must travel some distance to
another forum to litigate her claim to economic support. Furthermore,
when one recognizes that alimony is just one element in the total monies
available for the support of the whole family, mother and children, then
we must recognize that the present statutory scheme may cause significant financial hardship to the children of the dissolved marriage. This
factor will hopefully result in legislation permitting a wife to litigate her
claim for alimony in this jurisdiction. To avoid the possible hardship to
a husband who may live a considerable distance away from the jurisdiction, the better way to accomplish the desired result would be an amendment to the Uniform Support of Dependents Law giving the ex-wife the
same rights as the dependent wife.
19. See People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
20. Renaudin v. Renaudin, 37 App. Div. 2d 183, 323 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1971).
21. Id. at 185, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
22. Id. at 186-87, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49.
23. See Longines Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 459-60,
209 N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20-21 (1965).
24. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW art. 3-a (McKinney 1964); see Martin v. Martin, 58 Misc. 2d 459,
296 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Fan. Ct., Ulster Co. 1968).
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In another jurisdiction case,21 it was held that the family court has
jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Family Court Act to hear and decide
a claim for support against a New York State resident even though the
petitioner was a non-resident alien.
May a separation agreement executed in New York which was
incorporated but not merged into a Mexican divorce decree, provide the
family court with in personam jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in an
enforcement proceeding under Article 4 of the Family Court Act? An
affirmative answer was given in Lawrenz v. Lawrenz,21 wherein the court
held that CPLR Section 302 is applicable to family court and that a
separation agreement is a transaction of business within the meaning of
CPLR Section 302(a)(1).
Right to Alimony.-A decree of divorce granted to a man based
on the misconduct of his wife cannot bi used as the basis for vacating
retroactively support arrears based on a family court order for the support of the wife which had been entered by consent at a time when the
man was represented by counsel.27
Is a wife, against whom a judgment of divorce has been granted,
entitled to alimony pursuant to Section 236 of the Domestic Relations
8 the plaintiff husband, suing for divorce
Law? In Plancher v. Plancher,2
on the grounds that the parties have lived separate and apart pursuant
to a decree of separation, was held to be entitled to pre-trial disclosure
of the finances of the defendant wife in order to prepare for trial on the
issue of alimony. By indicating that the plaintiff would probably prevail
and obtain a divorce and that alimony could be provided as an incident
of the judgment, it seems as if the court is construing "misconduct" in
Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law as not to include the "nofault" grounds under sections 170(5) and (6).11
In a more far-reaching but somewhat questionable opinion 3 " a husband was granted a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The defendant's counterclaim for separation was denied because
of her recriminatory conduct. However, the court then went on to make
25. Swift v. Swift, 65 Misc. 2d 1014, 319 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Fam. Ct., Dutchess Co. 1971).
26. 65 Misc. 2d 627, 318 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Fain. Ct., Westchester Co. 1971).
27. Fine v. Fine. 65 Misc. 2d 87, 316 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1970).
28. 35 App. Div. 2d 417, 317 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1970); cf.Lewis v. Lewis, 37 App. Div.
2d 725, 323 N.Y.S.2d 864 (2d Dep't 1971).
29. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5), (6) (McKinney Supp. 1971). See Foster, Family Law,
1970 Survey oJ N. Y. Law, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv.207, 211 n. 28 (1971).
30. Woicik v. Woicik, 66 Misc. 2d 357, 321 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1971).
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an award of alimony based on the economic needs of the wife, citing the
decision of Judge Traynor in De Burgh v. De Burgh3' as authority for
justifying the award. Awarding alimony based on the economic needs
of the wife and the financial ability of the husband, regardless of fault,
while desirable and important, especially where the defendant wife also
obtains custody of children and the monies will be utilized for the support of the entire family, is unfortunately not within the discretion of
of the wife results in the husband obtainthe court when the misconduct
32
ing a decree of divorce.
Again recognizing the desirability of a fixed sum alimony award,
the First Department3 reversed a lower court decision which had granted
an open-ended temporary alimony award.
The obligation of a husband to make payments under a separation
agreement was held to have terminated upon the remarriage of the wife,3
even though the separation agreement contained no termination clause. 1
Counsel Fees.-Findingno contrary authority in the First Department or Court of Appeals, Judge Midonick held that Section 438 of the
Family Court Act gave the family court discretion to award counsel fees
even after a final order of support and visitation. 3 Because of the present
uncertainty regarding the phrase "at any stage in the proceedings",
contained in section 438, the legislature should give consideration to this
problem and resolve the conflict.
Property Settlement. -Where a judgment of divorce awarded the
wife exclusive possession of the marital residence, the fact that the judgment also terminated the tenancy by the entirety and created a tenancy
in common in the residence does not give the husband the right to seek
partition in a separate partition proceeding. Rather it was held that the
remedy of the husband is to seek a modification of the prior judgment
36
of divorce.
The rights of a tenant by the entirety was also considered by the
37
wherein the court held
Second Department in Plancher v. Plancher,
31. 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
32. See Schine v. Schine, 36 App. Div. 2d 300, 303, 319 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (1st Dep't 1971).
33. Weltz v. Weltz, 35 App. Div. 2d 208, 315 N.Y.S.2d 150 (lst Dep't 1970).
34. Griffin v. Faubel, 64 Misc. 2d 653, 315 N.Y.S.2d 243, (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1970).
35. Reed v. Reed, 63 Misc. 2d 459, 311 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Farn. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1970); contra,
Cassieri v. Cassieri, 31 App. Div. 2d 927, 298 N.Y.S.2d 844 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.).
36. Ripp v. Ripp, 64 Misc. 2d 323, 314 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1970); accord,
Davies v. Davies, 65 Misc. 2d 480, 318 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1971); contra, Pechstein
v. Pechstein, 64 Misc. 2d 969, 316 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1970).
37. 35 App. Div. 2d417, 317 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1970).
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that Section 170(5) of the Domestic Relations Law, permitting a divorce
where the parties have been separated pursuant to a decree of separation,
was not unconstitutional even though the effect of the decree would be
the termination of the tenancy.
PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS

Pre-Trial Examinations.-The apparent wide latitude enjoyed by
the family court in deciding whether a pre-trial examination is appropriate in any given case resulted in decisions during the past survey period
3
that give little or no guidance to the practitioner. 1
In a case involving the availability of a bill of particulars, a family
court 3 vacated a notice for a bill directed to the respondent where his
answer only contained a general denial. The bill was being sought to
learn if the respondent was going to claim at trial that the petitioner was
promiscuous, and if so, the names of the persons with whom the petitioner allegedly had intercourse. While not in issue before the court, it
would seem that the vacating of the bill should now be considered as
"special circumstances" sufficient to justify a restricted pre-trial examination, if one is sought, in order for petitioner to adequately prepare to
rebut the issue of promiscuity, if such is to be raised.40
Because of the restrictive attitude toward pre-trial examinations in
filiation cases, the Fourth Department"1 held that where the respondent
was called as a witness by the petitioner, she had the right to treat him
as a hostile witness and thus to lead and cross-examine him. The court
further stated that the restrictions on examinations before trial in filiation cases should be relaxed. 2
3
Inasmuch as the CPLR is applicable to family court proceedings1
and inasmuch as the bill of particular is not a disclosure device, there
seems to be no reason why a respondent in a filitation proceeding should
not be able to freely utilize one or more disclosure devices." The showing
38, See Green v. Smith, 65 Misc. 2d 588, 318 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Fam. Ct., Dutchess Co. 1970)
(denied examination); Green v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 226, 317 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Fam. Ct., Westchester
Co. 1970) (examination before trial granted); Linnie D.B. v. Lonnie J.H., 65 Misc. 2d 754, 317
N.Y.S.2d 832 (Fam. Ct., Westchester Co. 1970) (examination before trial granted).
39. Jesmer v. Beyma, 66 Misc. 2d 323, 321 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Fain. Ct., Monroe Co. 1971).
40. See Arlene W. v. Robert D., 36 App. Div. 2d 455, 460, N.Y.S.2d - (4th
Dep't 1971) ("Evidence of promiscuity, if present, would weigh heavily against petitioner.").
41. Id. at 456, - N.Y.S.2d at
.
42. Id. at 457, N.Y.S.2d at 43. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 165 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
44. N.Y. CPLR § 3102(a) (McKinney 1963).
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of special circumstances seems unnecessary in light of the power of the
family court to protect a party against abusive disclosure practices.,'
Statute of Limitations.-The decision in Wales v. Gallan,46 wherein
the court held that the dual limitation periods contained in Section 517
of the Family Court Act was unconstitutional, was held to be neither
binding nor acceptable in a recent decision. 7
In another case, 8 the family court rejected a somewhat novel defense that the paternity statute of limitations is available to a husband
in a non-support proceeding brought by his wife on behalf of a child born
during the marriage, where the husband denies paternity.
Right to Counsel.-Is a person summoned to defend himself in a
paternity proceeding entitled to be advised that he has a right to counsel
and that if he cannot afford one, the court will assign an attorney to
represent him? In two recent decisions during the survey period, the
Second Department held that inasmuch as the filiation proceeding is
civil in nature, the respondent had no such right where he was apparently
over twenty-one years of age. 9 However, where the respondent was sixteen years of age, the court,50 citing, inter alia, In re Gault,5 1 indicated
that admissions made in the absence of counsel may have impinged the
respondent's right to due process of law.
Are these opinions consistent on the issue of the right to legal
representation in a filiation proceeding? If the Leanna M.52 case is limited to holding that due process only requires that before a juvenile may
waive legal representation, he must fully comprehend all the ramifications of such a waiver, then perhaps the cases are consistent on the
assumption that an adult is intelligent enough to understand all the
ramifications of such a waiver. However, if such is the holding, does it
mean that if the infant requests counsel, after understanding the ramifications of waiving representation, and cannot afford to retain private
counsel, the court need not assign counsel to represent him? Perhaps, but
if such is the result then the juvenile in essence receives no more protection than the adult except that the indigent juvenile is made aware that
if he had money an attorney could be of real help to him.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

N.Y. CPLR § 3103 (McKinney 1963).
61 Misc. 2d 681, 306 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Fam. Ct., Richmond Co. 1969).
Green v. Smith, supra note 38.
Swift v. Swift, supra note 25.
Bido v. Albizu, 36 App. Div. 2d 537, 318 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.).
Leanna M. v. Douglas J., 35 App. Div. 2d 551, 315 N.Y.S.2d 271 (2d Dep't 1970).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Supra note 50.
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But if Leanna M.13 indicates that due process of law requires that
the infant be afforded counsel, which the author hopes is the implication
of the holding, then the cases still are inconsistent unless the tables have
been completely turned to the extent of affording constitutional protections to a juvenile while denying the same protections to an adult. 4
Perhaps, however, the recent decision in Boddie v. Connecticut,5
will provide some uniform direction in this area. While Boddie limited
itself to a divorce proceeding, it would seem that a logical extension
would cover, at least, a situation where an indigent person was a defendant in a civil case and was being denied the opportunity to defend
himself solely because of his poverty. If access to the courts is to be a
meaningful constitutional right, the principle of the Boddie case must
also mandate that an indigent respondent in a filiation case, inter alia,
be assigned counsel.
Legislation.-Article 5 of the Family Court Act was amended to
give the family court jurisdiction" to make an order of visitation 57 in
addition to its prior authority to determine custody, if there has been
an order of filiation or a court approved paternity agreement or compromise.
While these statutory provisions regarding custody and visitation
are phrased in neutral terms there is a strong judicial reluctance to award
custody to the biological father.5"
CHILD CUSTODY

While the "best interest" test 5 is the articulated standard in determining custody between parents who were, at least at one time husband
and wife, and is at least a factor in determining custody between a parent
and a third-party, it is sometimes unclear whether the courts are award53. Id.
54. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT, § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1971) which gives the family court the
authority to appoint a law guardian for a minor in any proceeding under the Family Court Act.
Whether this section is intended to be applicable to a minor who is a respondent in a proceeding is
unclear. If the statute is applicable, arguably the indigent adult respondent, in addition to any due
process claims he may have, is being denied equal protection of the laws.
55. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra note 9.
56. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1971, ch. 952, amending N.Y. FANI. CT. AcT § 511 (McKinney Supp.
1971).
57, N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1971, ch. 952, adding N.Y. FAN!. CT. AcT § 549 (McKinney Supp.
1971) (effective June 25, 1971).
58. See Loretta "Z" v. Clinton "A", 36 App. Div. 2d 995, 320 N.Y.S.2d 997 (3d Dep't 1971)
(mem.).
59. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1964).
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ing custody according to the "best interest" of the child or the "best
interest" of the parent.
In People ex rel. Mofett v. Cooper,0 two sixteen-year-old children
had been residing with their mother, as custodial parent, since birth, and
residing with their step-father for the past eleven years. While the mother
had been awarded custody pursuant to a divorce decree, the children had
physically resided with both parents until they were almost three years
of age. The father had been making monthly child support payments
and during the four years immediately preceding the commencement of
the proceeding, the children, for a period of three weeks during the
summers, had visited with the father. When the custodial parent died,
the father commenced a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain custody.
A court-appointed psychiatrist and psychologist both recommended that the children continue to reside with their step-father. The
two children opposed the writ and indicated their preference to stay in
their present surroundings and not move to Louisiana, the home of the
father.
In spite of the recommendations of the two experts,"' the desires of
sixteen-year-old children, and the fact that the step-father stood in a
parental relationship with the children for so long a period of time, the
court, finding that the father did not abandon the children and that he
was not unfit, held that there was no legal basis for denying the natural
father custody of his children.
While this "blood is thicker than water" approach taken by the
court may be appropriate where the third-party has not stood in a
parental relationship with a child for any significant period of time, in
a case where there has been a protracted substitute parent-child relationship, as in the Mojfett case,6" the focus should be on the best interest of
the child 3 and not on whether the biological parent has lost his "natural
right" to the custody of the children because of his unfitness. While this
approach may at times result in questionable decisions, at least the focus
of the proceeding will be on what is in fact best for the child involved.64
60. 63 Misc. 2d 1005, 314 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Fam. Ct., Dutchess Co. 1970).
61. But see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 34 App. Div. 2d 942, 312 N.Y.S.2d 348 (lst Dep't
1970) (mem.).
62. People ex rel. Moffett v. Cooper, supra note 60.
63. See Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REv.55, 82 (1969).
64. See Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949
(1966), where in a custody dispute between the natural father and maternal grandparents, the court
awarded custody to the grandparents on the grounds that it was in the best interests of the child
even though there was no showing that the natural parent was unfit.
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Children must be considered as persons rather than parental property
that can be retained or given away at the whim of a parent. It is interesting that while these sixteen-year-old children could not compel their
father to assume custody against his wishes, he can obtain their custody
over their strong objections.6"
To restore some balance to the parent-child custodial relationship,
there should be legislation recognizing that a child over a certain age has
at least the right to determine with whom he does not wish to live.
Again relying on automatic presumptions, the Third Department 6
reversed a family court order, and awarded custody of an illegitimate
three-year-old child to its mother even though the family court found
both parents fit and that the child had lived most of his life with his
father.
Under established law, the mother of an illegitimate child is prima facie
entitled to its custody if she is a proper and suitable person, even as
67
opposed to the child's father.
Whether the removal of the child from the father's custody would be
harmful to the child was never discussed by the court.
In another Third Department case," the court refused to grant the
petition of the father and ex-husband to modify a former custody award
even though there was evidence that the mother had entertained male
companions in her apartment overnight with the knowledge of the child,
because there was no showing that such conduct was affecting the upbringing of the child.
While full faith and credit may not be applicable to custody decrees," an appellate division decision 70 implicitly recognized that the
New York courts should not freely re-examine anew custody decrees of
sister states unless there is a showing that the parties have some significant contact with New York, over and above mere physical presence.
65. But see Hughes v. Hughes, 37 App. Div. 2d 606, 323 N.Y.S.2d 621 (2d Dep't 1971) where
in a custody dispute between natural parents, the court indicated that the desires of 16 and 17-yearold children must be given significant consideration.
66. Loretta -Z" v. Clinton "A",36 App. Div. 2d 995, 320 N.Y.S.2d 997 (3d Dep't 1971)
(mem.).
67, Id. at 996, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
68, Rodolfo "CC" v. Susan "CC", 37 App. Div. 2d 657, 322 N.Y.S.2d 388 (3d Dep't 1971).
69. Bachman v. Mejias, I N.Y.2d 575, 580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 868, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907
(1956).
70. Duke v. Duke, 37 App. Div. 2d 83, 85, 322 N.Y.S.2d 261, 264 (Ist Dep't 1971); see
proposed UNIFORM. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3.
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ADOPTIONS

The religious preference statutes 71 regulating adoptions were held
not violative of the Establishment Clause of the first amendment in two
recent decisions.
While upholding the statutes in question, the Appellate Division,
Furthermore, in a situation where the natural parents are unknown, the
matching was not mandatory and that:
[t]hese portions of the amended statutes plainly place the primary emphasis on the temporal best interests of 73the child, subordinating the
religious preference ot the natural parents.
Furthermore, in a situation where the natural parents are unknown, the
court stated that:
[C]hildren with unknown religious affiliation should be placed in the first
good home so far as consistent with the best interest of the child without
regard to the religion or non-religion of the prospective adoptive par74
ents .
In In re Efrain C., 75 Judge Dembitz, faced with a situation where a
five week attempt to find Catholic adoptive parents for a two-year-old
Catholic child was unsuccessful, directed that the child be placed with a
non-sectarian agency for adoption and in addition stated that subdivision (e) of Section 116 of the Family Court Act is constitutional only if
it is construed, where a child is placed with a sectarian agency, as not
preventing or substantially delaying the adoption of the child.
Consistent with its decision in Dickens v. Ernesto,71 the Fourth
Department 77 reversed a family court order which had denied an adoption because, inter alia,the religion of the adopting parents differed from
that of the child. In so holding the court indicated that religious differences, without more, is not sufficient reason to block an adoption.
To the extent that a fair reading of the above cases permits one to
conclude that they are in agreement-the best interests of the child is
paramount in attempting to find a suitable family and that such interest
71. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAst. CT. ACT § 116(e)
(McKinney 1963); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
72. Dickens v. Ernesto, 37 App. Div. 2d 102, 322 N.Y.S.2d 581 (4th Dep't 1971).
73. Id. at 106, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
74. Id. at 104, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
75. 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1970).
76. Dickens v. Ernesto, supra note 72.
77. In re Michael D., 37 App. Div. 2d 78, 322 N.Y.S.2d 532 (4th Dep't 1971).
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is not served when a child who has been given a religious designation is
denied the opportunity to be adopted merely because the potential family
is not of the same religion-they represent a positive step forward insofar as the rights of unwanted children and potential adopting families
are concerned.
What is left unclear is how the agencies, both sectarian and nonsectarian, are to implement the above decisions. Will the agency place
the child with the first suitable family regardless of religious matching?
Or, will there be a cutoff time before which the agency will attempt to
make a religious match and after which time, any family will be considered'? Further, will an atheist or agnostic be considered as a suitable
person to adopt a child of a designated religion? Will parents of one
religion ever be able to adopt a child of another religion if suitable
persons of that religion are available? While expensive, protracted litigation could possibly bring clarity to this area and resolve some of these
questions, the wisest course would be a legislative reconsideration of the
above-noted statutory provisions 7 in light of the decisions noted and the
questions posed.
Surrender and Consent.-The statutory provision 79 authorizing the
judiciary to permit the revocation of a surrender was the subject, at least
in one instance,'" of the much publicized litigation during the past year.
The "Baby Scarpetta" case, while causing substantial emotional
strain to all the parties concerned, merely reaffirmed previous decisions
of the New York courts that a mother may revoke a surrender before
an order of adoption, if such revocation is in the best interest of the
child.x '
In this case, five days after the agency placed "Baby Scarpetta"
with the adoptive parents, and within three weeks after the surrender was
executed, the natural mother sought to revoke her surrender. There is
no indication that the adopting parents were ever informed by the agency
of the mother's attempted revocation nor is there any indication that the
adopting parents were ever informed generally that a natural parent has
such a right. Clearly, if adoption placements are still going to be made
78. Supra note 71.
79. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(l) (McKinney 1966).
80. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d
787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971).
81. See Roe v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 36 App. Div. 2d 100, 318 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1st Dep't
1971), where the court found that the best interest of the child would not be served by permitting a
surrender revocation.
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prior to the time the surrender is final and binding on the natural parent,
there should be some legislative enactment requiring the adopting parents to be so informed in order for them to have an opportunity, at the
earliest moment, and before emotional ties with the child are further
strengthened, to decide whether they want to assume the risk of protracted litigation.
Furthermore, Section 384(4)82 of the Social Services Law does authorize an agency to petition the family or surrogate court for an order
approving the surrender, which is then binding on anyone who has been
given notice of such proceeding and an opportunity to be heard. Such a
proceeding can be commenced prior to the child being placed with adoptive parents. Unfortunately, the Spence-Chapin Adoption Agency did
not utilize this procedure.
To avoid the grief which is visited upon all the parties to these
contested proceedings and to give a greater degree of stability to the child
when there is a placement with adopting parents, it is recommended that
section 384(4)83 be amended so as to impose a mandatory obligation
upon an adoption agency to seek court approval of the surrender prior
to placement.
In In re Adoption of Brousal,84 Surrogate Sobel held that the adoption of a child born out of wedlock requires only the consent of the
natural mother" and that the natural father does not have any standing
to object to the adoption.
The statute " involved creates two classifications of fathers based on
the status of a child's birth. The first class is composed of fathers whose
children were born in wedlock; these fathers have the right to grant or
withhold consent to the adoption of their children. The second class is
composed of fathers whose children were born out of wedlock; these
fathers do not have any rights insofar as the adoption of their children
is concerned. While the constitutionality of the statutory exclusion was
apparently not in issue in Brousal, 7 it is the opinion of this author that

the statute creates an invidious classification that denies to the fathers
in the second class equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(4) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
Id.
66 Misc. 2d 711,322 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sur. Ct., Kings Co. 1971).
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
Id.
Supra note 81.
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amendment."'
Furthermore such a classification does not take into consideration
the father who has supported the child, the father who wishes to take
the child into his own home, and the father whom the natural mother
did not want to marry. Additionally, the interests of the child are perhaps being overlooked. What governmental interest is so strong as to
deny to the child the right to have his father present at such a
proceeding?
Abrogation.-Section 118-b of the Domestic Relations Law"9 authorizing adoptive parents to petition the court which originally granted
the adoption to abrogate the adoption because of the misbehavior of the
child, clearly sets up an obstacle to the complete integration of the
adopted child into the family. Even though courts are reluctant to grant
such petitions,'" the fact that they can be brought and the fact that
adopted children are treated differently than natural children seems sufficient reason to eliminate this provision.
Legislation.-In response to the "Baby Scarpetta"' 1 case which
held, inter alia, that prospective adoptive parents have no right to intervene in such proceedings, legislation was enacted9" giving the prospective
adoptive parents the right to intervene in a proceeding to set aside a
surrender. The amended statute permits the intervention to be made
anonymously or in the true name of the adopting parents. The statute
is silent as to whether the name option will be that of the court or the
proposed intervenors.
In other legislation,93 a state-wide adoption exchange was created
within the Department of Social Services. Regulatory implementation
of the exchange was left to the Department of Social Services or the
Board of Social Welfare.
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-PINS

Jury Trial.-The United States Supreme Court has decided that
children charged with juvenile delinquency are not entitled to a jury trial.
4 the Court held, in a plurality opinion
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,"
88. See Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); see generally H.
95-97 (1971).
89. N.Y. DoMi. REL. LAW § 118-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
90. See In re Anonymous, 63 Misc. 2d 661, 313 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sur. Ct., Erie Co. 1970).
91. Supra note80.
92. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1971, ch. 1142, amending N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
93. N.Y. SESS. LAWS, ch. 47, adding N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
94. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
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written by Justice Blackmun, 5 that trial by jury in the adjudicatory stage
of a juvenile court proceeding is not required by the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Rejecting the "wooden approach" of
justifying its decision by placing the "civil" label on the proceeding, 6
the Court emphasized three factors which it found to be determinative
of the issue: (1) in prior opinions expanding the procedural rights of
juveniles, the Court had focused on rights which improved the factfinding procedures of the juvenile court process, while "one cannot say
that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate
fact-finding"; 7 (2) the injection of the jury trial into the juvenile court
system might remake the juvenile proceeding into a full adversary process with the attendant delay, formality and publicity that the present
process ideally intended to eliminate; (3) the great weight of authoritative studies of the juvenile court process,' present state legislative
schemes, 9 and recent judicial opinions"* have held that the jury trial is
not an essential component of the juvenile justice system.
The Court reiterated the idealistic goals of the juvenile court process, made an express finding that these goals "have not been realized"' 0 1 but felt that the failures relate "to the lack of resources and of
dedication rather than to inherent unfairness." 0 2 In what can only be
taken as an ominous warning to those charged with the obligation of
translating the beneficial goals of the juvenile court process into reality,
the plurality opinion concluded with a statement designed to hasten the
pace of needed reform:
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its
separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one
day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it."1
95. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White,
Justices White and Harlan wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Black and Marshall joined. Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
96. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra note 94.
97. Id. at 543.
78. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967); cj. UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT

§ 24(a); STANDARD JUVENILE

COURT ACT art.

99. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra note 94, at 548, n. 7.

100. Id. at 549.
101. Id. at 544.

102. Id. at 548.
103. Id. at 551.

V,

§ 19.
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Section 758(b) of the New York Family Court Act provides that a
male who is found to be a juvenile delinquent because at the age of fifteen
he committed an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a
class A or class B felony may be committed to the Elmira Reception
Center, a prison for persons from age sixteen to twenty-one, in lieu of
placement in an institution for adjudicated juvenile delinquents. In a
decision rendered before McKeiver but in no way affected by its holding,
Judge Millard Midonick held, in In re Reginald S.,1 °4 that a juvenile
facing possible sentencing under section 758(b) was entitled either to a
trial by jury or to a pre-trial ruling by the court that any commitment
to Elmira under that section would be limited to a period not to exceed
six months. Judge Midonick reasoned that while the New York Court
of Appeals had held that jury trials were not required in most juvenile
cases,10 and correctly anticipated that the United States Supreme Court
would also so conclude, an exception must be made where the possible
result of the juvenile proceeding was commitment to an adult prison for
a period of three years. Since Baldwin v. New York 0 6 had held that a
jury trial must be afforded one who is subject to a sentence of more than
six months in an adult penal institution, the court correctly concluded
that the same requirement attached to juveniles who faced such a sentence under section 758(b).
In deciding which of the alternative remedies to afford the respondent, the court in Reginald S. was influenced by the recommendation
of the attorneys, particularly the prosecuting attorney, that a pre-trial
determination that the respondent could not be incarcerated in Elmira
for more than six months was acceptable. In choosing this alternative,
the court noted that had it chosen to afford the juvenile a jury trial, the
proper procedure would have been to grant leave to counsel to petition
10 7
the supreme court for an order of transfer to that court.

Burden of Proof.-In 1970 the Court of Appeals decided'

not to

give retroactive effect to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
In re Winship109 which held that in juvenile delinquency proceedings the
county must establish the elements of juvenile delinquency beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals reasoned that to permit the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

64 Misc. 2d 1002, 317 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1970).
In re Daniel Richard D., 27 N.Y.2d 90,261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970).
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
This procedure is authorized by the State Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 19(a).
In re Daniel Richard D., supra note 105.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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decision to have retroactive effect "would substantially affect countless
juvenile delinquency adjudications made on the prior standard.""10 The
Appellate Divisions for the First' and Second" 2 Departments have ignored that ruling in two cases decided last year. Both decisions held that
the Winship standard should be applied to cases commenced before
Winship was decided if the juvenile delinquency adjudication was not
final and was in the course of appellate review when Winship was decided.
In a brief memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals extended the
Winship decision into the PINS category this past year. Despite the fact
that the majority opinion in Winship explicitly limited its holding to
cases where the juvenile is charged with committing an act which would
constitute a crime if committed by an adult," 3 the Court of Appeals in
In re RichardS." 4 held that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required for an adjudication that a minor is a person in need
of supervision."" 5 While many critics of the PINS category will be
satisfied with nothing less than its complete repeal,"' others may take
some measure of satisfaction from the fact that the county will now have
the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that a child "'is
incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the law7
ful control of the parent.""1
The allocation of the burden of proof that the juvenile proceeded
against is within the age limitation established by statute was decided in
In re Don R. B. " 8 In that case the prosecuting attorney failed to establish
that at the time the act was committed" 9 the respondent was under the
age of sixteen years. 2 Despite the fact that the Family Court Act places
upon the prosecution the burden of alleging in the petition that the
respondent is below the required age,12 ' the court held that the respon110. Supra note 105 at 96, 261 N.E.2d at 631, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
111. In re Ivan V., 35 App. Div. 2d 806, 316 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Ist Dep't 1970).
112. In re Ronald H., 35 App. Div. 2d 845, 317 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d Dep't 1970).
113. In re Winship, supra note 109, at 359, n. 1.
114. In re Richard S., 27 N.Y.2d 802, 264 N.E.2d 861, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1970).
115. Id.
116. Cf. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694
(1966).
117. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712(b) (McKinney 1970).
118. 66 Misc. 2d 279, 320 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Fam. Ct., Kings Co. 1971).
119. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 71(a) (McKinney 1963) provides:
In determining the jurisdiction of the court . . . the age of the respondent at the time the
delinquent act allegedly was done. . . is controlling.
120. N.Y. FAM. CT. AT § 712(a) (McKinney 1963).
121. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 731(b) (McKinney 1963).
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dent is obligated to prove that he was not sixteen years of age at the time
the act was committed, and that "[t]he failure of the respondent to raise
any objection was a tacit admission as to the fact that he was under the
age of sixteen at the time of the occurrence of the act."' While it is not
unusual to see, in civil law, the allocation of the burden of pleading
placed on one party and the allocation of the burden of proof placed on
the other,'2 it is certainly most unusual to find such a dichotomy in
regard to an issue going to the jurisdiction of the court to hear a case. 24
Definitional Problems.-The PINS category has been further limited by cases reaffirming the established proposition'1 that acts which
constitute only "offenses" and not felonies-or misdemeanors cannot
serve as a basis for a PINS finding, absent proof that the offense has
been committed a sufficient number of times to constitute proof that the
juvenile is incorrigible or ungovernable. In In re David W., 26 the Court
of Appeals held in a per curiam opinion that a single act of harassment
was not sufficient to sustain a finding of juvenile delinquency nor to
sustain a finding that the respondent was a person in need of supervision.
In In re John "M",12 respondents were charged with a single act
of "glue sniffing". The petition charging juvenile delinquency originally
alleged that respondents had violated Section 3396 of the Public Health
Law, which would constitute merely an offense and thus could not support a finding of delinquency. The court permitted the police counsel to
amend the petition to allege possession of noxious material in violation
of Section 270.05 of the Penal Law, a misdemeanor, but was later
obligated to dismiss the petition when it decided that section 3396, a
more specific statute, controlled over the more broadly worded section
of the Penal Law. The court went on to point out that the respondents
could not be charged under the PINS category unless they were proven
to have engaged in glue-sniffing as a matter of habit, in which case they
might be deemed to be incorrigible and beyond the lawful control of
their parents. Judge Moskoff, in his opinion, stated that it was mandatory that the juvenile court be able to assume jurisdiction over juveniles
who commit single acts which constitute offenses or violations and appealed to the legislature to grant the juvenile court jurisdiction. He
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

In re Don R.B., supra note 118, at 283, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
E.g., Fowler v. Donnelly, 225 Ore. 287, 358 P.2d 485 (1960).
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 713 (McKinney 1963).
See, e.g., Bordone v. Allen F., 33 App. Div. 2d 890, 307 N.Y.S.2d 527 (4th Dep't 1969).
28 N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1971).
65 Misc. 2d. 609, 318 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Fain. Ct., Queens Co. 1971).
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suggested that the PINS category be expanded to cover single acts
within those two categories.
Judge Dembitz contributed another of her incisive and well documented opinions this year. In In re Mario,121 she held that a habitual
truant could be placed in a state training school, despite apparent contrary precedent,12 and upheld the constitutionality of such a placement
over the argument that one who has committed no crime or act harmful
to others cannot be restrained of his liberty. Having found that the
respondent would not be benefited by probation or placement in an
"open facility", and that with certain safeguards, the juvenile would be
more likely to be rehabilitated in the state training school, the court
concluded that the doctrine of parens patriae "continues in that the
State has the power to perform the parental role of insuring the child's
education and training, when the parent is unable to control him sufficiently to perform it." 1 0Judge Dembitz also had occasion to uphold the
constitutionality of section 712 in response to the charge that the phrase
131
"habitual truant" was unconstitutionally vague.
Despite the fact that Section 115 of the Family Court Act grants
the family court jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency cases "as set forth
in article seven" and that article seven limits the definition of juvenile
delinquents to certain persons who do "any act which, if done by an
adult would constitute a crime,"132 a juvenile was this year adjudicated
a delinquent for non-criminal conduct. A section of the Penal Law
provides that any person under the age of sixteen who has in his possession any loaded cartridges or ammunition shall be adjudged a juvenile
delinquent. 13 No provision makes the equivalent act a crime if commit128. 65 Misc. 2d 708,317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1971).
129. In re Jeannette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.); In
re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1970).
130. In re Mario, supra note 128 at 717, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
131. The court indicated that while the phrase "habitual truant" lacks precision, under the
established, if informal procedure followed by the family court, a child found to come within the
provision is placed on probation or parole and specific requirements of school attendance are spelled
out as a condition of probation [see N.Y. RuLEs OF FAM. CT. R. 7.6 (McKinney 1963)], and
placement occurs only when the child violates the specific regulations governing school attendance,
Id. at 715, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
Section 712 of the Family Court Act has been amended and in place of the phrase "habitual
truant," the statute has substituted the phrase "who does not attend school in accord with the
provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1971).
132. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712(a) (McKinney 1963).
133. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.05(4) (McKinney 1967).

FAMILY LAW

ted by an adult. In re Don R. B. 3 4 held that a juvenile who violated that
section of the Penal Law could be adjudicated a juvenile delinquent by

the family court. The court stated that "[t]here is no indication that the
Legislature intended section 712 to be an all-inclusive definition of juvenile delinquency or that it intended to pre-empt the field with that section
and not allow for further expansion of the definition by subsequent
legislative action."' 3 If the legislature is inclined to respond to the ap-

peal of the court in In re John "M", the approach adopted in this
section of the Penal Law may be an appropiate vehicle for change. 3
The Right to and Need for Treatment.-The most frequently articulated reason for granting fewer procedural rights to a juvenile charged

with misdoings than to an adult has been that the juvenile court process
is aimed at the rehabilitation of juveniles rather than their punishment,
and that in pursuance of this goal the juvenile justice system may forgo
some of the procedural protections afforded adult criminals. 37 The rec-

ognition that this goal has not yet been achieved in all cases has, of
course, been a factor in the recent extension of some procedural rights
to juveniles. 3 This year, the courts recognized that the absence of a need

for rehabilitation or the inability of the state to offer meaningful treatment in a particular case justified not only greater pre-adjudication
procedural rights, but additional remedial action as well.

While Section 712 of the Family Court Act requires only that two
facts be established before one comes within the definition of "juvenile
delinquent" -that a proscribed act has been committed by one of a
certain age-the prosecuting authorities have, in theory at least, always
been obligated to prove more. A petition in a juvenile delinquency pro134. In re Don R.B., supra note 118.
135. Id. at 282, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The court also upheld the statute over an argument that
the failure to constitute the same act a violation of the Penal Law when committed by an adult
was violative of the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 282-83, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
136. It should be noted however, that an argument can be made that the family court lacks
jurisdiction over juveniles charged with acts which define conduct as constituting juvenile delinquency but which do not constitute a crime if committed by an adult. Section 115(a) of the Family
Court Act grants the family court exclusive original jurisdiction over "proceedings concerning
juvenile delinquency. . . as set forth in article seven," and article seven appears to cover only those
allegations of delinquency which arise from what would be criminal conduct if committed by an
adult. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 712(a), 731(a) (McKinney 1963); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 742 (McKinney Supp. 1971). However, Section 115(c) of the Family Court Act does grant to
the family court -'such other jurisdiction as is provided by law," and the statute defining juvenile
delinquency in the Penal Law might possibly be read as impliedly including an extension of the
jurisdiction of the court to hear cases arising under that provision.
137. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra note 94.
138. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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ceeding must contain an allegation that "the respondent requires supervision, treatment or confinement,"' 139 and a PINS petition must allege
that respondent requires "supervision or treatment."'4 The age and act
criteria must be established at the fact-finding hearing, while proof of
the need for supervision, treatment or confinement is presented at the
dispositional hearing.14'
Because the decision in In re Winship specifically stated that its
holding did not apply to the dispositional stage of a delinquency proceeding, 4 2 the county's burden of proof of the need for treatment' 4 3 need only
be established by a preponderance of the evidence, while the requirements of necessary age and proscribed act must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, it is clear that the county is required to
prove each of the allegations required to be contained in the petition and
that failure to do so will result in the dismissal of the petition.' 4
In In re Edwin R., 4 5 the court dismissed petitions alleging juvenile
delinquency because it felt that there was no need for confinement, treatment or supervision. In that case, several respondents were charged with
the fatal stabbing of a victim, an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute the crime of murder. The case was not ready for trial
until two years after the alleged acts occurred, in part because of lengthy
pre-trial hearings and motions. In the interim, the respondents, with the
assistance of their law guardians, social workers and psychiatrists were
found to have made remarkable strides toward rehabilitation and adjustment. In light of this, the presiding judge called a hearing prior to the
fact-finding hearing to determine whether the allegations in the petition
139. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 73 1(c) (McKinney 1963).
140. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 732(c) (McKinney 1963).
141. N.Y. FAM. CT. AT § 742 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 743 (McKinney 1963).
142. In re Winship, supra note 109 at 359, n.1.
143. While Section 73 1(c) of the Family Court Act lists confinement, supervision or treatment
in the alternative, it would seem obvious that, if the sole purpose of proceeding under article seven
was to confine the juvenile, the Family Court Act could not continue to deny the juvenile any
procedural rights presently afforded adults. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971). Supervision, merely for the sake of supervision and not for the purpose of treatment would
likewise, in the author's opinion, be an impermissible basis for proceeding in a family court which
lacks all the procedural safeguards afforded adults. Only "treatment" and the hope of rehabilitation through treatment can form a proper conceptual basis for proceeding against a juvenile in the
less formal family court. Thus, it is the opinion of this writer that, despite the language of section
731 (c) and section 732(c) to the contrary, the prosecuting authority must allege and prove that the
respondent needs treatment before a finding of juvenile delinquency or PINS can be made.
144. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 751 (McKinney 1963).
145. 67 Misc. 2d 452, -_ N.Y.S.2d (Fam. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1971).

FAMILY LAW

reciting that respondents were in need of "supervision, treatment or
confinement" were true.
After a full adversary hearing on the issue, the court concluded that
respondents' voluntary pre-trial rehabilitation program had been so successful that there was no need to treat, confine or supervise respondents
in the future. The petitions were dismissed. The court quoted with approval from the only earlier case that dealt with the issue:
[A] finding of delinquency or PINS requires a basis of a finding of a
condition showing need for the attention of the court, in addition to the
mere conduct alleged, and in this respect differs from the criminal procedures for older persons. The Family Court does not find a child "delinquent" or "PINS" unless there is need for its rehabilitative or protective
functions.'
While the opinion may rest in large part upon the particularly
convincing proof of rehabilitation that was presented at the hearing and
the presence on the bench of a judge of unusual judicial sensitivity, it
should serve, at the least, as a reminder that the successful prosecution
of juvenile delinquency and PINS actions requires a positive showing
that there is a need for treatment.'
The case of In re Hone I.,' decided in 1970, also places sharp focus
on the rehabilitation premise underlying the juvenile justice process. A
fifteen-year-old girl had been adjudicated a PINS and was placed in the
New York Training School with directions to the institution that it
provide her with the psychiatric treatment which the court apparently
found respondent needed as required by Section 732(c) of the Family
Court Act. Upon discovering that the training school was unable, due
to inadequate staffing, to provide the treatment required by respondent,
the court suggested that the law guardian move for a termination of
placement under Section 762 of the Family Court Act. At the hearing,
the court determined that the required treatment was not being given,
vacated the order of placement, ordered a new dispositional hearing and
placed respondent on probation for one year while referring her to the
probation department for counseling and psychotherapy.
The opinion makes clear that if institutionalization is ordered at the
termination of a proceeding under Article 7 of the Family Court Act in
fesponse to a proven need for treatment, the receipt of such treatment is
146. In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 197, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848 (Fain. Ct., Queens Co. 1963).
147. But cI. In re Taylor, 62 Misc. 2d 529, 309 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Fam. Ct., Dutchess Co. 1970)
(fifteen-year-old girl found delinquent merely upon a showing that she threw a rock at a playmate).
148. 64 Misc. 2d 878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Fam. Ct., Queens Co. 1970).
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a continuing condition of the institutionalization, and upon proof of a
failure to receive such treatment, the juvenile may be released from the
institution. The decision could provide the vehicle for the incorporation
of the "right to treatment"" 9 movement into the juvenile justice process.
The Cost of Treatment.-In Jesmer v. Dundon,59 the Court of
Appeals upheld a provision in the Family Court Act which makes the
parents of a child institutionalized as a result of a finding of delinquency
or PINS liable for all or part of the cost to the county for such confinement. 51 Finding that the statute merely continues the parental duty to
support his child,5 2 the Court found no violation of due process. The
appellant argued that it was a violation of equal protection to require
her to contribute to the support of a child committed under Article 7 of
the Family Court Act while no statute required parents to contribute to
the support of minors sentenced to institutions as a result of convictions
as wayward minors or youthful offenders. The Court found "some reasonable basis" for the distinction in that minors in the latter categories
were committed more for the state's own protection, and less for the
parental-like goal of rehabilitation which is the articulated end sought
by an article 7 commitment. The Court thus affirmed the family court
order that appellant pay seventy dollars per month toward the support
of her son. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case was the
statement made in oral argument that the county was paying the institution, the Berkshire Farm for Boys, at the rate of twelve thousand dollars
per year for the care of the child. i
When the family court, pursuant to Section 437 of the Social Services Law, seeks to revoke the parole of a minor who had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, committed to an institution and then paroled, the minor must be afforded notice of specific allegations of misconduct, a hearing, and the aid of counsel. Rejecting arguments that
such a procedure would provoke undesirable friction between the juvenile and his social worker, and that the presence of an attorney would
unduly prolong such a hearing, the Court of Appeals in People ex rel.
Silbert v. Cohen' 51 found no conceptual justification for denying juve149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See G.H. MORRIS, THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT (1970).
29 N.Y.2d 5, 271 N.E.2d 905, 323 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1971).
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 233(b) (McKinney 1963).
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1963).
Jesmer v. Dundon, supra note 150 at 8 n.2, 271 N.E.2d at 906 n.2, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 418

154. 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971).
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niles a right which it had recently extended to adults in People ex rel.
55
Menechino v. Warden.
Further extending the rights of notice, a hearing and the assistance
of counsel beyond the confines of the basic adjudicatory hearing, the
Court of Appeals also held last year that these rights must be granted a

juvenile when an extension of his placement is sought under Section
756(b) of the Family Court Act.'5 6 The right to a hearing and to counsel
may not prove to be of much value, however, unless some meaningful

criteria are established for determining when a continuation of placement will be granted. Is a child who has been placed after a finding of
habitual truancy to be released when the preponderance of evidence
indicates that he will attend school regularly, or only when he is completely "rehabilitated" in all respects?

Another court

57

has recognized the right of a juvenile to have his

arrest record expunged from police files where the arrest was clearly
groundless and no valid purpose would be served by the perpetuation of
the records.'5 The court suggested that the problem was ripe for compre-

hensive legislative treatment, but felt that in the interim, courts should
continue to act in appropriate cases to fashion a remedy.
New York courts had little difficulty in extending to juveniles the

right to obtain a bill of particulars, 159 and the same right to obtain a

transcript of the testimony of a witness who testified before a grand jury
that adults presently enjoy.'" However, it was decided that the supreme
court is without power to issue a certificate of reasonable doubt when a
notice of appeal is filed from the family court to the appellate division.' 6'

The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide because of the
155. 27 N.Y.2d 376,267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
156. People ex rel. Arthur F. v. Hill, 29 N.Y.2d 17,271 N.E.2d 91!,323 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1971).
See also People ex rel. Cox v. Appelton, 62 Misc. 2d 403, 309 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga
Co. 1970).
157. In a case reported in last year's Survey, In re Smith & Vasquez, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 310
N.Y.S.2d 617 (Fam. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1970), similar relief had been granted.
158. Henry v. Looney, 65 Misc. 2d 759, 317 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1971).
159. In re Edgar L., 66 Misc. 2d 142, 320 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Fam. Ct., Kings Co. 1971). But cf.
In re Santos C., 66 Misc. 2d 761,322 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Fam. Ct., Bronx Co. 1971).
160. Gold v. Quinones, 37 App. Div. 2d 618, N.Y.S.2d (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.).
The court noted that only the supreme court in which the grand jury was held had the power to
order production of grand jury minutes, but indicated that the family court should grant an
adjournment of the trial so that respondent may apply to the court having jurisdiction of the grand
jury minutes for permission to inspect them.
161. Palmer v. Mclnerney, 35 App. Div. 2d 428, 316 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2d Dep't 1970). The
proper procedure is to apply to the appellate division to stay the execution of the family court order.
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particular facts of the case before it whether protection from double
jeopardy is a constitutional right that must be afforded juveniles.,"
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS

In a decision self-described as "important to the development of
this area of law,"'6 3 a family court judge upheld the sufficiency of a
neglect petition charging a parent with neglect solely on the basis that
"the . . .children are likely to suffer harm in that another child . . .
also in the home, was abused by the respondent father and was found
to be an abused child in this Court .... "I4
The petitioner argued in
opposition to the motion to dismiss that a finding that a parent has
abused one child is sufficient to justify judicial intervention into the
entire spectrum of parent-child relations in the family, and that a court
is free to intervene whenever there exists a rational basis for doing so.
The rational basis for so acting in this case, petitioner argued, was the
fact that experts in the field of child abuse have concluded that where
abuse occurs in regard to one child in the family, "some form of active
supervision and help must be available if the siblings remaining in the
65
family are to be protected." 1
The court agreed with the petitioner's argument and found additional support in Section 1046(a)(i) of the Family Court Act which
provides that "proof of the abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any other child."'"
The decision is indefensible from a procedural point of view. Section 1031 of the Family Court Act requires that the petition contain
"facts sufficient to establish that a child is an abused or neglected
child."'' 1 7 A petition that alleges only that the parent had abused another
child once before may contain evidence of abuse, but surely that allegation alone even if proven does not constitute sufficient evidence to support a finding of neglect. That such evidence alone cannot suffice to
establish neglect, and thus cannot when alleged in a petition be sufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss can be demonstrated by comparing the
language of the Family Court Act permitting such evidence to be intro- 162. Antonio F. v. Judges of Family Court, 27 N.Y.2d 915, 265 N.E.2d 926, 317 N.Y.S.2d
632 (1970). See S. Fox, THE LAW OF JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL § 8 at 28-30 (1971).
163. In re Abeena H., 64 Misc. 2d 965, 967, 316 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (Fain. Ct., Kings Co. 1970).
164. Id. at 965, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
165. R. HELPHER, THE BATTERED CHILD (1968).
166. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
167. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1031(a) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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duced at trial with other subsections of the same provision which provide
that certain types of evidence are not only admissible, but also shall be
sufficient, by themselves to establish a prima facie case of neglect.16 The
failure to provide that evidence of abuse of one child shall constitute
prima facie proof of the neglect of another child is clearly indicative of
a legislative determination that such evidence alone is insufficient and
thus a petition containing only such an allegation cannot withstand a
motion to dismiss.
The effect of the decision is to permit a social worker acting upon
mere suspicion to file a petition inadequate on its face in the hope that
subsequent investigation will produce sufficient evidence to justify the
judicial intervention into the family that has already occurred. If such a
procedure is justifiable under the rubric of parenspatriaethe legislature
should so provide. Until then, courts should follow the articulated policy
of the statutes and demand that petitions contain allegations of "facts
sufficient to establish that a child is an abused or neglected child."'"'
The elasticity of the definition of neglect as interpreted by the courts
is further demonstrated by the decision in In re H Children, 7' a case
decided in 1970 by Judge Potoker. In that case the petition alleged that
five minor children, the oldest of which was thirteen, were neglected
because the respondent-mother had removed the children from the marital home and had taken up residence with the man whom the wife
intended to marry when her divorce was finalized. There appeared to
have been no expert testimony to the effect that the new living arrangement had in fact been demonstrably detrimental to the children's mental
or emotional condition, but the court, taking judicial notice that "[t]he
gods visit the sins of the fathers upon the children," ' 171 and quoting
approvingly the language of an earlier case to the effect that "our courts
will continue to insist upon a high level of moral conduct on the part of
168. Compare N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1971) which provides that
"'proofof the abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse
or neglect of any other child of... the respondent" with, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii)
(MeKinney Supp. 1971) which provides that
proof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a child of such a nature as
would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the
parent . . . shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse or neglect, as the case may be
. [Emphasis added].
169. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1031(a) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
170. 65 Misc. 2d 187, 317 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Fam. Ct., Queens Co. 1970). For a well-reasoned
case reaching an opposite conclusion in a very similar factual setting, see In re Raya, 255 Cal. App.
2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Ct. App. 1967).
171. In re H Children, supra note 170, at 189, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
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custodians of children, and will never succumb to the 'Hollywood' type
of morality so popular today,"' 172 concluded its finding that neglect had
been proven with the rhetorical question: "Who can deny that the children herein. . . do not now or might not in the immediate future suffer
detrimental damage attributable to the adulterous act of their
mother." 173 The court was careful in limiting its holding, stating that
"isolated instances of infidelity can be overlooked," 174 but drawing the
line when the married woman takes up residence with the man she
intends to marry. Perhaps the ultimate irony in the case is the statement
of the court that the mother "may very well have been justified in
removing herself and . . . [the] children from the petitioner's home
because of alleged misconduct on part of petitioner."' 75 The court also
should have considered whether its decision, branding the conduct of the
mother as immoral and harmful to the children, might have a more
detrimental effect on the emotional well-being of the children than the
conduct of the mother would have were it not so categorized.
A similar fact pattern was presented in In re Darlene T.176 decided
by the Court of Appeals last year. The Onondaga County Family Court
found a mother guilty of neglect in part because the mother "did allow
men to visit her and remain in her apartment during the night, and on
occasions allowed male companions to remain overnight."' 77 The court
made a finding that the mother was guilty of neglect and remanded the
child to the custody of her mother subject to various conditions including
that she not entertain male visitors in her home.
The case was appealed by the petitioner on the grounds that the
court had abused its discretion in permitting the mother to maintain
custody of the child and that relevant testimony had been incorrectly
excluded from the dispositional hearing. The respondent chose not to
appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of neglect, in
part no doubt because independent grounds of neglect apart from immorality were proven, 178 and in part because, unlike the factual pattern in
172. In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 411, 412, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (Fam. Ct., Rensselaer
Co. 1962).
173. In re H Children, supra note 170, at 189, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 537-538.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 187-88, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 536. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the
paramour was supporting the household and that he got along so well with the children that both
their attendance and grades at school showed a marked improvement since the change of residence.
176. 28 N.Y.2d 391, 271 N.E.2d 215, 322 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1971).
177. Id. at 393-94,271 N.E.2d at 216, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
178. The family court had found that the respondent had left her daughter "unattended under
circumstances dangerous to her welfare." Id.
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In re H Children,'79 the mother in Darlene T. was found to have had

sexual intercouse in the presence of the child. Presumably such activity
in the presence of a child might be said with more certainty to have a
detrimental effect on the emotional or mental condition of a child" 0than
the mere fact that the mother is living in the same household with a man

to whom she is not married.'
The Court of Appeals did not address the question of the sufficiency

of the evidence to establish neglect but held that in the absence of a
specific finding, based upon the evidence, that the mother was fit to care
for the child and that the best interests of the child would be served by

permitting her to remain with her mother, the trial court abused its
discretion in remanding the child to the custody of the mother.
The Court, while arguing that the family court was to be granted
wide latitude in determining the custody issue, stated that the trial
court's decision may be set aside "where it lacks sound and substantial
basis in the testimony or is opposed to everything presented to the

court."' The Court further found that it was error to exclude at the
dispositional hearing, evidence of the conduct of the respondent between
the time the petition was filed and the time of the hearing, since such
evidence was of probative value in determining the fitness of the mother

to care for the child.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, also found cause to

reverse a decision reached in a dispositional hearing in a neglect case this
year. In In re Carmen" ' the family court had entered an order removing
the children from the home and placing them in the custody of the
Department of Social Services after the respondent consented, without

a fact-finding hearing, to the entry of a finding of neglect. The court
179. Supra note 170.
180, Indeed, such conduct might constitute neglect even if the participants are married to one
another.
18 1. One of the most difficult questions in the area of neglect is the issue of the extent to which
failure of the parents to follow currently acceptable moral standards should be grounds for judicial
intervention under the neglect statute or in determining custody questions. Compare Judge Desmond's language in Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 394, 83 N.E.2d 848, 849 (1949) ("No court
welcomes such problems or feels at ease in deciding them. But a decision there must be, and it
cannot be one repugnant to all normal concepts of sex, family and marriage.") with In re Raya,
supra note 170.
182. In re Darlene T., supra note 176 at 395, 271 N.E.2d at 217, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The
Court of Appeals was quoting an earlier decision written by Judge Desmond which set the parameters for appellate review of such decisions. See Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848
(1949).
183. 37 App. Div. 2d 629, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d Dep't 1971).
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found that the record did not support a decision to remove the children
from the home, "a disposition, which should be employed only in grave
and urgent circumstances." '8 4 The court indicated that the family
court's order of disposition may in part have been influenced by the
inability of the social worker to communicate with the respondent
mother, since the respondent spoke only Spanish and the social worker
spoke only English.' 5
The Family Court Act requires the court to state the grounds for
any disposition it orders. 86 It would be hoped that judges reading In re
Carmen would interpret it to require the court, before ordering the child
removed from the home, to articulate the reasons why a less drastic
disposition was not justified, and to state precisely the "grave and urgent
circumstances" compelling removal of the child from home. Such a
procedure would facilitate judicial review of the dispositional decision
while possibly improving the quality of the family court judge's decision.
It is a principle now well established that, in some circumstances
at least, a court may find a parent guilty of neglect for failure to provide or permit required medical treatment to be administered to a child,
on the grounds that such treatment would violate the religious beliefs of
the parent. 87 The difficulty arises in determining at which point the
parent's failure to provide medical treatment justifies the court's intervention and substitution of its judgment for that of the parent. In re
Kevin Sampson188 posed that question in factual circumstances so
closely weighed on either side as to make almost impossible the judge's
obligation to decide the matter.
The fifteen-year-old boy involved in the case suffered from neurofibromatosis, resulting in a massive deformity of the face, which while not
affecting the youth's sight, hearing, or past personality development was
found to be "an overriding limiting factor militating against his future
development" which, unless alleviated by surgery, would make "his
184. Id. at 630, __
N.Y.S.2d at
185. Id. See In re Urdianyk, 27 App. Div. 2d 122, 276 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dep't 1967).
186. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1052(b) (McKinney 1970).
187. E.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. Mo. 1952); Santos
v. Goldstein, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1st Dep't 1962) (mem.). The cases are
reviewed in In re Kevin Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct., Ulster Co. 1970),
affd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (3d Dep't 1971). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d
1138 (1953).
188. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct., Ulster Co. 1970), affd, 37 App. Div. 2d
668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (3d Dep't 1971).
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chances for a normal, useful life . . . virtually nil." 18' The disease posed
no immediate threat to the life or health of the child and the called-for
surgery, even if entirely successful, while improving his appearance,
would only alleviate and not cure the disease.
The recommended surgery would be dangerous in any event, but the
risk would be entirely unacceptable if the surgeons respected the
mother's demand, based upon her beliefs as a member of the religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, that blood transfusions not be administered during surgery. Medical testimony established that from a
purely medical point of view, there would be less risk if the surgery were
delayed until the youth reached the age of twenty-one, and the law
guardian recommended such a delay so that the child could himself
make the decision.
The court, giving primary weight to its belief that "a normal, happy
existence . . difficult of attainment under the most propitious circumstances. . . will unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement is not
corrected" 41 soon, found the child to be neglected and ordered that
corrective surgery be performed unless the surgeons responsible for the
child's medical treatment determined that the contemplated procedures
posed unacceptable medical risk to the life of the child.
In reaching its decision, the court was obligated to distinguish a
decision by the Court of Appeals, In re Seiferth"' which held that medical treatment could not be ordered over a parent's religiously based
objections in the absence of "present emergency.""11 2 Seiferth was found
to be of "doubtful validity" because of the presence in that case of a
dissent joined in by three members of the court, and the subsequent
passage of the New York Family Court Act which the family court
judge found "to confer upon the court the broadest power and discretion
3
to deal with these matters."
The court also chose to ignore the law guardian's plea that surgery
be delayed until the child reached the age of twenty-one and could make
the decision himself.
The family court judge quoted with approval from Judge Fuld's
dissenting opinion in Seiferth to the effect that the child's consent is not
made necessary or material under the statute or case law, and that in
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
Id. at 674, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
Id. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
In re Sampson, supra note 188, at 670, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
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any event the proceeding is based on the finding of neglect by the parent,
and the child's condoning of neglect "cannot be operative on the question as to whether or not they are guilty of neglect.""'
While it is true that the child's desires are nowhere mentioned as
controlling, it would certainly be desirable to take his opinion into account, since at the least, the child's feelings may be relevant to the issue
of whether the proposed course of action will be beneficial to the youth's
future rehabilitation. An individual who believes that surgical treatment
received by him, even if court ordered, has violated his religious tenets
may be psychologically and developmentally worse off with corrective
surgery than without it. To the extent that the opinion totally ignores
5
the feelings of the youth, it may be criticized.1
Two courts were asked to decide whether respondents in a child
protective proceeding would be permitted to examine hospital records of
the child who was allegedly mistreated, and the courts reached opposite
conclusions. In In re Walsh' 6 the court refused to permit the parents to
view their child's hospital records prior to the fact-finding hearing on
the grounds that they were protected by the physician-patient privilege." 7
In light of the fact that the Family Court Act specifically provides that
the physician-patient privilege shall not be grounds for excluding evidence in a child protective proceeding," 8 the ruling seems clearly erroneous. If the material will in any event be introduced at the trial, there
seems to be no valid reason for denying a party access to it prior to
trial."' In In re Carolyn D.,20° it was held that pertinent records of a
county hospital which conducted a physical examination of the child at
194. In re Seiferth, supra note 191, at 87, 127 N.E.2d at 824 (dissenting opinion).
195. In Seiferth the Court of Appeals stressed the need to consult the child and seek his
approval in order to assure his cooperation in future efforts to rehabilitate him. The family court
judge in that case had the fourteen-year-old child become fully aware of the surgical procedures
involved in correcting a cleft palate and harelip and made every effort to fully inform the child of
the ramifications of the operation prior to asking him for consent.
It should be noted that Seiferth, unlike Sampson, involved a case in which there was no unusual
danger involved in the operation and a delay in performing surgery would make more difficult the
surgical procedures. Thus, the differences between the two cases were such that the case for nonintervention by the court was stronger in Sampson than it had been in Seiferth.
196. 64 Misc. 2d 293, 315 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Fain. Ct., Westchester Co. 1970).
197. The privilege is codified in N.Y. CPLR § 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1971). The fact that
the law guardian did not assert the privilege is irrelevant, since the privilege attaches automatically
unless there is an affirmative waiver by the patient. See RICHARDSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 450
(9th ed. 1964).
198. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
199. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
200. 65 Misc. 2d 752, 317 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Fain. Ct., Westchester Co. 1970).
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the request of petitioner were discoverable pursuant to Rule 3120 of the
CPLR. The court found that such disclosure was appropriate since it
would assist the parents in preparing for trial.
In the Walsh case,2 1 respondent's request for a trial by jury was
denied on the grounds that the neglect proceeding is not criminal in
nature. Since a parent cannot, as a result of a finding of neglect or abuse,
be sentenced directly to jail, 2 2 and in no event can be jailed for more
than six months for failure to comply with the terms of a court order
under article 10,20 the decision is clearly correct in regard to the parent's
request for a jury trial, at least under present judicial interpretation of
the sixth amendment.20 4 A more interesting question would have been
posed had the law guardian asserted that the child was entitled to a jury
trial under the sixth amendment, but not only has that argument never
been made, but the decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,2 5 probably
precludes the possibility of its successful presentation in the future.
Judge Dembitz has ruled that the mere fact that a judge in a hearing
to determine if one person is guilty of neglect, directs that a neglect
petition should be filed against another person 2° 1 is not in itself grounds
for demanding that a different judge be assigned to hear the neglect case
that has been instituted under the direction of the first judge.2 17 Declaring
that to hold otherwise would jeopardize the desirable movement to assign one judge to conduct all phases of a single case, the court found
support for its position in "principle, precedent, and policy. 12 8
In the same case, the court held that a social worker who had
interviewed the respondent in a neglect case could testify as to their
conversation even if the social worker had not warned respondents that
her statements could be used against her in court. It was held that since
the proceeding was civil, and since to hold otherwise would frustrate the
state's performance of its role as parens patriae, no warning was required and, furthermore, that in the factual circumstances in which the
information was obtained, the statements would not be suppressed even
if the proceeding were criminal in nature. 2 9 The question is worthy of
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Supranote 196.
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1052 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1072 (McKinney 1970).
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
This procedure is authorized by N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1032(e) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
In re Diana A., 65 Misc. 2d 1034, 319 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1971).
Id. at 1040,319 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
Id.
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further consideration. Whatever the merits of the argument that the
Constitution does not require a warning be given, it is possible that a
respondent caught in the poverty cycle who has had several occasions
to deal with social workers may feel obligated to speak with them, and
may well feel betrayed and unwilling to cooperate with any social worker
in the post-hearing probation stage of the case when she finds at the trial
that her conversations with the social worker are being used against her.
Thus it is possible that permitting such testimony in the absence of clear
knowledge by the respondent that it may be used against her may do
more to frustrate the state's real goals of rehabilitation and correction
than would the contrary practice.
Publicity.-In the wake of considerable controversy concerning the
handling of neglect and abuse cases in Onondaga County, the Commissioner of Social Services sought a court order permitting him to release
his records, kept pursuant to statute, 210 to a local newspaper. The supreme court held that the applicable statute did not authorize release of
the records on the application of the Commissioner. 211 While the decision
was based on a narrow question of statutory interpretation, the court
spoke of the need to protect involved individuals from the glare of publicity, and the need to assure privacy in order to encourage the resolution
of family problems through legal means. The court found in dictum that
the petitioner's request was motivated not so much by a desire to serve
the public interest as "for the purpose of apology or explanation of their
official acts," and indicated that any change in policy must be made by
21 2
the legislature.
Permanent Neglect.-Priorto June 25, 1971, a child could not be
found to be "permanently neglected" unless the agency having custody
of the child alleged in its petition and proved that it had made "diligent
efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship" while the
child was temporarily in their custody. 21 The effect of this provision was
to require the authorized agency to encourage the parent to assume
parental responsibilities even when it was convinced that the best interests of the child would not be served by a return to the home. In at least
one case, a court refused to find a child to be permanently neglected
because the agency, certain that adoption, not a return to the parents,
was in the best interest of the child, failed to encourage the parents to
210.
211.
212.
213.

N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
In re Lascaris, 65 Misc. 2d 787, 3J9 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1971),
Id. at 788, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 1963).
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21 4
prepare for a return of the child.
The legislature has cured this problem by amending the relevant
provisions so that the agency is required to show that it has attempted
to strengthen the parental relationship only "when such efforts will not
be detrimental to the moral and temporal welfare of the child. ' 215 The
amendment will create no greater difficulty of proof for the petitioner
than existed under prior law, since the petitioner has always been required to allege and prove that the best interests of the child require
216
permanent termination of parental custody.

214. In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Farn. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1969). The court
suggested that corrective legislation was needed.
215. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 611 (McKinney Supp. 1971). See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 614(c) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
216. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614(e) (McKinney 1963).

